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REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONERS FRED MEYER 
AND/OR LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In its Order Granting Motion for Review, the 
Industrial Commission erroneously interpreted the legal 
standards set forth in Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 
P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) for cases involving workers with a 
preexisting condition aggravated by an industrial injury. In 
the absence of a newly enacted statute or appellate decision 
subsequent to Allen, the Industrial Commission lacks the 
equitable power to overturn Allen. In the case at bar, the 
Industrial Commission has attempted to create its own unique 
"exception" to Allen, effectuating a substantial revision or 
modification of that landmark decision. Accordingly, a 
correction-of-error standard should be applied on appeal, and 
no deference should be given to the Industrial Commission's 
interpretation. 
One of the principal purposes of Allen was the 
establishment of a "clear and workable rule for future 
application by the Commission." Id. at 18. The Industrial 
Commission has, by this decision, destroyed this clear and 
workable rule. The exception which the Industrial Commission 
has attempted to create with this decision is entirely 
unworkable and creates significant confusion in an area where 
none previously existed. Finally, the record does not 
support Ms. Shelley's contention that her preexisting condition 
was solely caused by prior industrial injuries; rather, 
Dr. Beck found that her preexisting condition was entirely 
unrelated to the prior industrial injuries. Even her treating 
physicians noted that she had fully recovered from the prior 
industrial injuries. Nevertheless, the Industrial Commission 
rendered its decision without requesting any medical evidence 
or opinion on the critical issue of the case: the source of 
Ms. Shelley's preexisting degenerative disc disease. Without 
medical evidence to establish the source of Shelley's 
preexisting condition, even the Industrial Commission's 
"exception" to Allen would not allow Shelley to obtain 
benefits. Therefore, the Industrial Commission's award of 
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benefits should be reversed and the decision of the 
Administrative Law Judge reinstated. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
BECAUSE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S ORDER INVOLVED A 
GENERAL QUESTION OF LAW, A CORRECTION-OF-ERROR STANDARD IS 
APPLIED ON REVIEW. 
Respondent Shelley ("Shelley") concedes that her 
activities at the time of the accident did not meet the 
higher standard of legal causation (unusual or extraordinary 
exertion) as outlined in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 
supra. Shelley also acknowledges that she was suffering from 
a preexisting condition at the time of her 1985 industrial 
accident. The Utah Supreme Court in Allen stated that, 
without exception, the higher standard of legal causation must 
be established in cases involving preexisting conditions. 
Despite this well-established law, Shelley maintains that it 
was proper to reverse the decision of the Administrative Law 
Judge and to modify Allen significantly in awarding her 
benefits. 
The Industrial Commission must follow Utah's workers 
compensation statutes and the applicable case law 
interpretation of those statutes. The Industrial Commission's 
actions in this instance involve the interpretation of a 
question of law addressed in Allen. Accordingly, as 
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reaffirmed by several recent decisions, a correction-of-error 
standard is applied on appeal in reviewing interpretations of 
general questions of law, and no deference is given to the 
expertise of the Industrial Commission. Bd. of Educ. of 
Alpine Dist. v. Olsen, 684 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1984). 
In Allen, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted Utah 
Code Annotated § 35-1-45 which provides that a compensable 
industrial claim must occur by "accident arising out of or in 
the course of employment." Id. at 18. The Court held that 
to come within the ambit of Section 45, a worker has the burden 
of establishing legal causation. In the case at hand, Shelley 
has acknowledged that she has not met her burden of 
establishing the higher standard of legal causation required by 
the court in Allen. In the absence of legal causation, the 
Industrial Commission cannot arbitrarily carve out exceptions 
to the Allen decision to the effect that the higher standard 
of legal causation need not be met when a preexisting condition 
is due to prior industrial accidents with the same employer. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Allen made no 
distinctions as to the source of a preexisting condition, and 
specifically stated that the purpose of its decision in Allen 
was to provide "a clear and workable rule for future 
application by the Commission." Id. at 18. For the 
Industrial Commission to ignore this clear and workable rule in 
attempting to establish "exceptions" to a decision of the Utah 
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Supreme Court is an abuse of discretion, and this Court should 
give no deference to the Industrial Commission in reviewing its 
decision in this matter. 
Significantly, Allen was decided by the Utah 
Supreme Court in 1986. The Courts analysis in Allen 
continues to be the standard for determining compensability of 
workers compensation claims when preexisting conditions are 
involved. No exceptions to this "clear and workable" rule have 
been implemented by legislative action or by any subsequent 
appellate opinion. Without such action, the Industrial 
Commission does not have equitable powers to overturn or 
modify Allen. As this court stated in a recent opinion, 
Bevans v. Industrial Commission, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 99 
(Utah App. 1990), the Industrial Commission is not a court of 
equity, but must follow the applicable statutes and case law. 
Id. at 101. The appropriate forum for a change in Utah's 
statutes or case law is the legislature; it is not for the 
Industrial Commission to carve out "exceptions." The Allen 
decision has been in existence for over four years, and the 
legislature has not taken any steps or enacted any legislation 
to narrow its parameters. Thus, the Industrial Commission must 
follow the guidelines outlined in Allen. 
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POINT II 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT 
SHELLEY'S CLAIM THAT HER PREEXISTING BACK CONDITION 
IS DUE SOLELY TO HER WORK ACTIVITIES AT FRED MEYER. 
The medical evidence available to the Industrial 
Commission revealed that Shelley suffered from a ratable 
preexisting impairment. The only doctor to render an opinion 
as to the source of Shelley's preexisting degenerative disc 
disease was Dr. R. David Beck. At the request of the 
Administrative Law Judge, Shelley submitted to an independent 
medical examination from Dr. Beck, an orthopedic surgeon, on 
October 2, 1987. Dr. Beck examined Shelley's previous 
medical records before concluding that half of Shelley's 
permanent impairment was attributable to the May 6, 1985 
industrial injury, and "half to preexisting conditions 
including disease." Dr. Beck went on to state that "the 
injuries of 1975 and 1978 probably have no bearing on her 
long-term problem." R. at 294, emphasis supplied. Thus, 
while Shelley claims that Dr. Beck was merely expressing his 
"opinion" in this regard, the evidence reveals that Dr. Beck 
was asked by the Administrative Law Judge to conduct this 
exam. Moreover, Dr. Beck had access to all of Shelley's 
medical records in conducting his examination. 
Significantly, after Dr. Beck's report was 
received, Shelley requested an evaluation by a formal medical 
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panel. However, she failed to appear for that examination. 
Thus, the only medical evidence and testimony before the 
Administrative Law Judge (and, subsequently, the Industrial 
Commission) in relation to Shelley's medical condition came 
from Dr. Beck. Had Shelley desired to refute those findings, 
she needed to attend the medical panel examination (or procure 
a second medical opinion on her own behalf). Having not done 
so, she cannot now contend that her preexisting conditions were 
clearly caused by the previous industrial injuries of 1975 and 
1978. 
In fact, Shelley's treating physicians acknowledged 
that she fully recovered from both the 1975 and 1978 industrial 
injuries. Dr. J. Charles Rich stated: 
It is interesting that 10 or 11 years ago 
she was off work for about 3 weeks under 
the care of Dr. Hargreaves when she 
injured her back at work, had physical 
therapy, and then went back to work at the 
end of about three weeks. Again in 1979 
[1978] she saw you because of an injury 
which occurred at work but she only missed 
part of one day, had some physical therapy 
but worked at the same time, and then has 
been doing satisfactorily until 05/03/85. 
Report of Dr. Rich dated June 13, 198 5. (R. at 216, emphasis 
supplied.) Dr. William Allred also noted: 
The patient has had hypertension for 16 
years. She is status post a hysterectomy 
for dysfunctional uterine bleeding and also 
at the time of her hysterectomy she had 
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repair of a cystocele and rectocele. She 
has had a long history of a hiatal hernia 
with severe chest pain, secondary to the 
hiatal hernia and she is status post on 
elbow injury as well as two previous back 
injuries at the time of work, however, the 
symptoms did not persist after these 
injuries and improved with conservative 
therapy. 
History and Physical Examination of Dr. Allred dated July 22, 
1985. (R. at 264, emphasis supplied.) Thus, any claim that 
Shelley's current condition resulted from a preexisting 
condition related to each of these injuries is merely 
speculation and cannot properly be the basis upon which the 
Industrial Commission attempted to create an "exception" to the 
well-established rule in Allen. Moreover, in Jones v. 
California Packing Corp., 244 P.2d 640, 644 (Utah 1952), the 
Utah Supreme Court stated that the law does not vest the 
Commission with the "arbitrative power to disbelieve or 
disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence." 
The Administrative Law Judge, in reaching his 
decision below, received no prior guidelines or direction from 
the Industrial Commission as to its unusual interpretation of 
Allen. Accordingly, neither any of the parties nor the 
Administrative Law Judge attempted to address the issue of the 
source of Shelley's preexisting conditions. Even assuming, 
arguendo, the legitimacy of the Industrial Commission's 
"exception," for the Industrial Commission to have properly 
implemented this exception, it should have remanded the case to 
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the Administrative Law Judge for a specific medical finding as 
to the source of Shelley's preexisting conditions. (This 
assumes, of course, that the Industrial Commission disbelieved 
or disregarded the specific opinion of Dr. Beck already in the 
record.) Without a specific medical finding to support its 
"exception," the Industrial Commission can only speculate as to 
whether Shelley's degenerative spondylolisthesis is due solely 
to prior employment activities or to nonindustrial factors. 
POINT III 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S RULING IN THIS CASE IS 
AN UNWORKABLE PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE CASES. 
The Industrial Commission has attempted to create an 
"exception" to the well-established law in Allen because 
Shelley's condition may have been related to prior 
work-related injuries with the same employer. Even assuming, 
arguendo, that the Industrial Commission's assumption is 
accurate, the solution is remarkably unworkable for future 
cases. For example, it treats employees with identical medical 
conditions in a greatly disparate manner. One employee might 
receive benefits for an injury merely by remaining with the 
same employer; another employee, with an identical injury and 
medical history, would go without benefits if he or she, by 
pure chance, happened to switch to a different employer, even 
if the new employer were in the exact same business. If the 
Industrial Commission's ruling were taken to its logical 
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extremef even Shelley would not receive benefits in this 
case. Specifically, Shelley's 1975 and 1978 injuries arose 
while working for Grand Central, While not by Shelley's 
choice, her employer changed to Fred Meyer upon Fred Meyer's 
acquisition of Grand Central. From a workability standpoint, 
the eff€ict of this change of employment is the same as if 
Shelley had voluntarily moved from Grand Central to Fred Meyer 
(or to a ShopKo or K-Mart) and continued to perform identical 
duties. Because of this change in Shelley's employer, a strict 
reading of the Industrial Commission's analysis would be 
sufficient to deny her all benefits. 
An even more difficult problem with the Industrial 
Commission's analysis relates to the legal standard of 
causation that would be applied in any particular case. For 
example, if an employee, suffering from a congenital condition, 
aggravated that condition in an initial industrial injury, what 
legal standard of causation would be applied in the event that 
same employee suffered a second industrial injury with the same 
employer? Would the higher standard of legal causation 
espoused in Allen govern inasmuch as the employee 
unquestionably suffered from a congenital preexisting 
condition? Or, would the lower standard espoused by the 
Industrial Commission apply because the latter industrial 
injury might be related to the initial industrial injury? Or, 
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would there be some type of intermediate standard of legal 
causation? 
While the Industrial Commission in the present case 
has attempted to carve out some type of "equitable exception" 
to Allen, the far-reaching effects of this "exception" reveal 
the obvious weaknesses in the Industrial Commission's 
decision. When the Supreme Court established its "clear and 
workable" rule in Allen, the purpose of that rule was to 
avoid the exact problems that the Industrial Commission is 
encountering with its decision in this case. The Allen 
decision has governed for over four years without the confusion 
brought on by the Industrial Commission in this decision. 
Therefore, the Industrial Commission's decision should be 
overturned and the Administrative Law Judge's Order should be 
reinstated. Only through this action can the Allen standards 
remain "clear and workable." 
CONCLUSION 
In the case at bar, the Industrial Commission has 
attempted to create an "exception" to the Utah Supreme 
Court's landmark decision in Allen. This action by the 
Industrial Commission is based entirely on its legal 
interpretation of Allen, and no deference should be given to 
its decision. The Industrial Commission is not a court of 
equity, and must enforce the case law and statutes as they 
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presently exist. In this instance, the Industrial Commission 
has utterly failed to do so. 
Furthermore, this decision provides no guidance or 
direction as to the appropriate legal standard of causation to 
be applied in future cases. Rather, it creates chaos. 
Therefore, this court, applying a correctness-of-error standard 
of review, should reverse the decision of the Industrial 
Commission and reinstate the Administrative Law Judge's prior 
Order. 
DATED this of May, 1990. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
<s=-;;S=MTCHAE£rE. DY] 
LLOYD A. HARDCASTLE 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
Fred Meyer and/or Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Company 
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